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a b s t r a c t
Secessionist movements rarely succeed in their quests for separate statehood. Hence, conﬂict resolution
efforts in secessionist wars tend to focus on making autonomy frameworks acceptable to both sides. This
article posits that de-radicalization on the issue of secession and speciﬁcally the endorsement of
regionalism over secessionism is an important prerequisite for such autonomy arrangements to succeed.
A programmatic shift toward regionalism represents a determinant shift in the ideology and raison d’e^tre
of secessionist movements. Drawing on insights from the literature on party change and rebel group
transformation, a twofold contribution is made. First, moderation can occur in the absence of electoral
participation as a result of internal shifts in the dominant faction of a rebel group. Second, identifying
two mechanisms as drivers for group identity change, organizational diversiﬁcation and internal debate,
it shows how under certain condition fragmentation may induce moderation on core ideological issues of
the armed movement. These arguments are developed through an inductive analysis of the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM). In this case, moderation on the issue of secession was the outcome of the formation
and strengthening of a moderate domestic wing, increased internal debate and the subsequent weak-
ening of the symbolic powers of a long-standing insurgent leadership.
© 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Of all types of intra-state conﬂict, disputes over self-
determination are the most intractable and the least likely to end
with a settlement (Walter, 2009). A common feature of movements
such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) and the Polisario Front in Western Sahara is
that they have maintained their armed struggles for several de-
cades with relatively few resources. What remains clear, however,
is that international support is a sine qua non in the quest for
separate statehood, with East Timor, Kosovo and South Sudan being
the exceptions in their achievement of self-determination and in-
ternational recognition rather than the norm for these ‘geopolitical
anomalies’ (c.f. Jeffrey, McConnell, & Wilson, 2015). Conﬂict reso-
lution in the case of secessionist wars therefore tends to be found
not in awarding recognition but in awarding autonomy to seces-
sionist regions (Caspersen, 2017, 4). International peace
negotiations therefore focus on reaching negotiated settlements
that accommodate separatists within the state together with offers
of formal reintegration programs and opportunities for armed
groups to transform into political parties (S€oderberg Kovacs&Hatz,
2016). During themost recent peace negotiations between the LTTE
and the Sri Lankan government, the international facilitators
explored a federal solution as an alternative to self-determination
(Stokke, 2009), and recent negotiations between the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippine government led to the
signing of a peace agreement that stipulated rebel group inclusion
and special autonomy provisions (Walch, 2014). Indeed, such au-
tonomy arrangements were the basis of the Helsinki agreement
signed between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indone-
sian government in 2005 (MoU 2005).
Despite the trend by states and international peacemakers to
seek to accommodate separatists with forms of territorial self-
government and democratic inclusion and the growing number
of peace agreements that follow this trajectory, little has been
written about the dynamics within the armed movements them-
selves that enable this transition. To date, the literature has tended
to view the decision by armed secessionist movements to accept
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autonomy and demilitarize primarily as a strategic shift in their
primary mode of mobilization instead of depicting any real change
in the group's position on the issue of secession. An implicit
premise is that autonomy provisions will appease secessionist de-
mands and that inclusion will have a self-moderating effect on the
armed group. The conﬂict resolution literature, however, has
focused on the speciﬁc framework for negotiations and on identi-
fying the moment of ripeness for when protagonists may
compromise (c.f. Stedman, 1997, Sisk, 2004). From these analyses, it
is generally agreed that the presence or absence of moderate voices
within the armed group and the strength of the group's political
wing are crucial factors in determining whether the protagonists
reach an agreement (Sisk, 2004, p. 257). However, the question of
how such moderate wings emerge and under what conditions they
prevail vis-a-vis the more radical wings of the movements remains
under-explored. This article addresses this lacuna in the literature
by focusing on the ideology dimension of armed secessionist
movements in order to tackle the question of why and how some
armed secessionist movements moderate and adopt a regionalist
position.
The present discussion of ideological de-radicalization on the
issue of secession, taken here to mean a move from propagating
secessionism to propagating regionalism, is situated within the
contemporary scholarly debates about rebel group transformation
and party change (e.g. Berti, 2013; Ishiyama, 2016; Manning, 2008;
Sindre & S€oderstr€om, 2016; S€oderberg Kovacs, 2008), while also
extending debates in political geography on the signiﬁcance of
transnationality for understanding rebel group behavior (e.g.
Jeffrey et al., 2015; McConnell, Moreau, & Dittmer, 2012; Schlichte,
2012; Salehyan, 2009). The question of what explains ideological
moderation on the issue of secession brings into focus an under-
explored topic among party scholars and conﬂict scholars alike,
namely how changes in visions and ideas shape prospects for
conﬂict resolution. Although the topic of ethno-regionalism fea-
tures prominently in the party literature, studies of the ideology of
ethno-regionalist movements and parties are rare exceptions (e.g.,
Massetti & Schakel, 2016; Massetti, 2009; Newman, 1997). How-
ever, as Gomez-Reino, De Winter, and Lynch (2006, 252) conclude,
ideology stands out as the most important aspect to cover in future
research on sub-national politics. In its conceptualization of ide-
ology, this article follows Massetti and Schakel (2016: 60, 76-7f4)
focusing on the core ideology of ethno-nationalist movements,
namely the relationship between the region and the state.
Regionalist ideology, or regionalism, depicts that the region is a
separate body politic vis-a-vis the state to which it belongs
(Massetti & Schakel, 2016, p. 60). Secessionist and regionalist po-
sitions correspond to radical and moderate ethno-nationalist ide-
ologies respectively (Newman, 1997).
Against this backdrop, the following argument is made. While
general conﬂict dynamics and state behavior are important factors
in explaining why conﬂicts come to an end, whether an armed
secessionist movement adopts a regionalist stance is a matter of
internal shifts within the movement and, in particular, the emer-
gence or strengthening of a new faction that propose alternative
visions for the movement and territory. Two mechanisms are
identiﬁed as determinants for promoting ideological change on the
secessionism-regionalism spectrum: Organizational diversiﬁcation
and internal debate. Diversiﬁcation, here taken to mean the
manifestation of a more complex political organization that breaks
with conventional military hierarchies, follows naturally for any
political organization that seeks to cultivate political change (Berti,
2013, p. 19; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1033). Internal debate is
enabled by such organizational changes, especially if the leadership
is weakened and no longer controls the propaganda apparatus or
the internal political discourse. The analysis thus challenges
arguments that organizational fragmentation mostly leads to
radicalization and violence (e.g., Cunningham, 2014; Pearlman,
2011). As is suggested here, fragmentation may shift the internal
balance of power and allow for a new and potentially more mod-
erate political discourse to emerge. This argument brings nuance to
contemporary debates about ethno-nationalist movements that
ﬁnd that fragmentation or the lack of cohesion leads to further
radicalization and violence (Bakke, 2015; Cunningham, 2014;
Pearlman, 2011). By taking a closer look at the rebel organization
and in particular by identifying the internal fault-lines for frag-
mentation through the lens of organizational theory, this study
shows that organizational change may also induce moderation on
the core ideology of armed groups. Furthermore, when taking into
account the transnational character of secessionist liberation
movements, a central question precludes towhether organizational
expansion brought about by the increased engagement in diplo-
macy, transnational activism and exile beyond the homeland by
armed secessionist movements, may inﬂuence not only their stra-
tegic adaptation, as has previously been suggested (e.g. McConnell
&Wilson, 2015; Salehyan, 2009), but also lead to shifts in political
visions and ideological perspectives.
This study uses an inductive approach to develop a framework
that helps shed light on how shifts in groups' and individuals’ po-
litical convictions are products of intra-organizational conﬂict that
arises in the context of organizational change. The above-stated
claims also indicate the methodological usefulness of within-case
analysis, particularly historical diachronic analysis, which poten-
tially can help explain change in movements and parties with
ostensibly similar characteristics. To conduct the within-case
analysis, this article uses the Free Aceh Movement (Geraken Aceh
Merdeka, GAM) to develop new theoretical insights into the issue of
ideological change in secessionist movements. The empirical
analysis is built around a combination of primary and secondary
sources including interviews with leaders and members of the
former armed group conducted between 2006 and 2014. Although
the study itself does not provide a general theory for ideological
moderation, it identiﬁes a set of mechanisms drawn from the
literature on party change and rebel group transformation that
sheds light on identity change.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the
concept of moderation, clarifying how it is understood with regard
to ideological moderation on the issue of secession. It develops the
theoretical argument underpinning this study, drawing attention to
key mechanisms driving ideological adaptation by political move-
ments. This is followed by a clariﬁcation of the methodology and
data used for the analysis. The framework is then applied to GAM,
tracing the changes in its organizational structure while explaining
the shifts in the group's political discourse. The ﬁnal conclusion also
discusses the usefulness of this framework beyond Aceh.
Theory: moderation and organizational change
Moderation: concepts and approaches
What constitutes ideological moderation within armed
groups? Conventionally, studies of political moderation have
focused on explaining how extremist political parties, particularly
religious parties, have adapted to democracy and the extent to
which they have become more inclusive and liberal in their pol-
icies and outlook ridding them of exclusionary and illiberal posi-
tions (e.g., Huntington, 1991, pp. 165e71; Kalyvas, 1996; Bermeo,
1997). Hence, numerous studies view moderation primarily as a
process of adaptation to democracy employing a teleological
argument that political inclusion tends ‘to appease the radical
tenets of extremist groups’ (Brocker & Künkler, 2013). Others are
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more cautious. As Brocker and Künkler (2013) note, moderation
may be a temporary strategy to attract more widespread support,
both domestically and internationally, implying that once in a
position of power, radical parties reinforce their exclusivist illib-
eral agenda from within.
There are some obvious parallels between this literature on
moderation and the literature on rebel group transformation,
especially concerning the distinction between ‘strategic’ and ‘real’
moderation and the implications this may have for the stability of
peace settlements. Regarding the centrality of inclusion for
moderation, scholars have highlighted how the participation in
peace talks, international diplomacy and a discourse supporting
human rights are often central to enhancing the legitimacy of
armed groups, both domestically and internationally (Caspersen,
2017, pp. 141e42; Berti, 2013, p. 161; McConnell & Wilson, 2015).
The desire to be viewed as legitimate politicians may encourage a
shift in discourse and even full or partial shift away from the
group's reliance on violence (Sindre, 2016b, Ishiyama & Marshall,
2017). However, because demands for sovereignty and commit-
ment to democracy are not mutually exclusive, it is not a prereq-
uisite that secessionist movementsmoderate their goal of secession
to reach a peace settlement (Caspersen, 2011; Whiting, 2016). It is
reasonable, however, to assume that a peace settlement that does
not ‘resolve’ the core issue of the conﬂict, i.e. the issue of secession,
will most likely prove less stable in the long-run. A peace settle-
ment may also be the outcome of a temporary dominance of a pro-
settlement wing within the armed movement (Ishiyama & Batta,
2011) just as recurring friction between militant and political
wings within armed movements may lead to an unstable peace
(Berti, 2013). Ishiyama and Batta (2011) show how for the case of
the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M), any process of ‘modera-
tion’ that cause party leadership to abandon the goal of a ‘people's
war’ to replace the existing monarchy with a ‘revolutionary council’
and transform into an electoral party was made possible by a
temporary truce between a ‘moderate’ and militant faction. Peace
negotiations and settlements may be pushed through by power-
seeking elites within the movement, who wish to access the
spoils of ofﬁce whereas the ‘true-believers’ may act as spoilers and
jeopardize the peace settlement by outbidding pro-settlement
forces (Caspersen, 2017, p. 145).
This highlights what Manning (2008, 141) argues to be a con-
ceptual problem of conﬂating two separate issues in discussions
about moderation, namely, that of ‘creating democratic actors’
versus the idea that inclusion leads to changes in the identity of the
armed movement. This study is concerned with the latter, namely,
what explains identity change in armed secessionist movements,
bringing into focus the need to conceptualize which aspect of a
groups' behavior and ideology are transformed or moderated.
Wickham (2004: 206) views moderation as the ‘abandonment’ or
‘revision’ of radical goals that ‘enables an opposition movement to
accommodate itself to the give and take of “normal” competitive
politics.’ Others seek a more ﬁne-tuned operationalization,
considering whether speciﬁc policies remain ‘exclusionist’ or
‘illiberal’ (Schwedler, 2007; Ishiyama & Widmeier, 2013, p. 538).
Combining the two, moderation in ethno-nationalist movements
thus assumes a deliberative shift towards endorsing a regionalist
political agenda, which in essence also endorses the existence of a
multi-ethnic state, as opposed to the largely mono-ethnic state
originally engrained in the demand for secession.
Against this backdrop, what remains clear from the above dis-
cussion is that the transition to peace is often the result of a
commitment to reform by at least segment of the movement's
leadership or a newly formed faction. What is less debated is under
what conditions ‘reformists’ take the lead and manage to shift the
internal discourse and commitment of the armed movement.
Organizational structure and change: diversiﬁcation and internal
debate
Organizational development of armed political groups is a
product of fundamental internal struggles over group identity and
power (Ishiyama & Batta, 2011). Identifying how and when these
struggles emerge and how they are addressed internally will help
explain not only the groups’ decisions to adjust their strategic
behavior but also the conditions under which ideological change
may lead groups to adopt alternative political visions.
Insights from the party literature give useful indicators for how
to conceptualize change in political groups. According to Harmel
and Janda (1994: 267e8), ‘change,’ deﬁned as major alterations of
a political party's strategy and program, usually takes place as a
result of an external shock, a change of dominant factions, or a
change in party leader. Panebianco (1988: 205) shows that a
complex and unstable political environment is expected to affect
movement stability negatively, since it ‘increases uncertainty’ and
produces diversiﬁcation among different sub-groups of the party,
which can heighten conﬂict over differences in political strategies
among the internal groups e which in turn may lead to faction-
alism. Because factionalism undermines the stability of the domi-
nant coalition of the party, it also increases the likelihood of party
change (Harmel & Janda, 1994, p. 279). Importantly, following this
reasoning, factionalism is not synonymous with radicalization.
Rather, it is the types of factions that determine which changes will
incur. This perspective contrasts with arguments presented in
contemporary scholarship on ethno-nationalist conﬂicts that tends
to argue that organizational fragmentation within rebel groups
leads to radicalization and violence. Pearlman (2011, 217) argues
that the formation of new factions within self-determination
movements, i.e., ‘splinter and semi-splinter groups,’ increases the
likelihood for a movement to use violence, whereas organizational
cohesion renders more peaceful forms of protest. Similarly, Cun-
ningham notes that ‘[internally] divided self-determination groups’
are both ‘more likely to get selective accommodation by the state’
and to ‘engage in armed violence’ e both with the state and
internally (Cunningham, 2014, p. 10). In instances of selective ac-
commodation, radical splinter groups may continue the armed
struggle or represent serious spoilers to any settlement reached.
Offering nuance to these arguments, the following case analysis
demonstrates that looking more carefully at the rebel organization;
what type of sub-groups emerge and the political discourse and
ideas that each sub-group propagate enable insights into points of
contention, agreement andmotivations for change. As suggested by
party scholars, organizational change is not always a conﬂictual
process but may occur organically as a political movement grows.
This may also be the case for armed political groups as it is in the
nature of any political organization, armed or non-armed, to seek
growth and expansion as a means to strengthen its position and
outreach (Berti, 2013). The rebel governance literature demon-
strates how rebel groups evolve into complex bureaucratic orga-
nizations in response to demands from civilians (Mampilly, 2011).
However, organizational change may also be a consequence of
shifting opportunity structures that enable increased recruitment
and domestic popular mobilization. As such, ‘[o]rganizational
change can be understood as an important tool employed by
different subunits within the same organization whether to
maintain or to gain additional authority and inﬂuence, or to shift
the internal power dynamics in their favor’ (Berti, 2013, p. 20).
The transnational dimension of the organizational structure of
secessionist movements is also important for understanding their
organizational evolution. Political geographers have drawn atten-
tion to the signiﬁcance of the ‘global’ in the manifestation of armed
groups. As Schlichte suggests, ‘the formation of an armed group is
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always a highly internationalized process’ (Schlichte, 2012, p. 720).
Sometimes, counterinsurgency campaigns force rebel leaderships
to establish themselves outside their territorial base, leading them
to form ‘governments in exile’ that mimic the governmental
structures of their state-in-waiting (McConnell et al., 2012). Pro-
tracted conﬂict also creates diaspora communities, which lend
economic and political support to the ‘cause’ and struggle for the
homeland. Many members of the diaspora community engage
politically, either as part of the diplomatic missions or as political
wings of the ethno-nationalist movements. As ‘geopolitical anom-
alies’ lacking international recognition, international connections
and the development of transnational networks become especially
signiﬁcant to how secessionist movements adapt their struggle
over time. McConnell and Wilson (2015, 77) note that when in a
position of protracted ‘liminality,’ governments in exile constantly
navigate between ‘internal recognition’ and ‘external non-recog-
nition,’ subsequently adjusting their behavior in a constant bid for
legitimacy. That said, the literature also cautions against viewing
such ‘ﬂexibility’ as a sign of moderation. While transnational ties
may expose leaders and members to new ideas and foster alter-
native visions, diaspora communities are also known to have a
strong commitment to radical nationalism, thus opposing attempts
at conﬂict resolution short of independence (Orjuela, 2008; Smith,
2007).
Hence, organizational diversiﬁcation, domestically and trans-
nationally, might pose a challenge to the leadership, increase intra-
group tensions and damage the group's internal cohesion. How-
ever, competition brought about by diversiﬁcation and the
strengthening of new factions and sub-groups may also cause or-
ganizations to become more accommodative and potentially
induce segments of the leadership group to reconsider their most
radical positions. Brocker and Künkler (2013) summarize the gen-
eral insights from the party literature as follows:
‘Where internal party discourse is subject to public discourses
(and the rival practices, ideologies and systems of symbolism and
meaning expressed therein), ﬁnding a receptive audience and being
able to mobilise agreement may require the development of more
moderate positions, the strengthening of already existing moderate
tendencies within the party and the evolution of a “multidimen-
sional” identity of the party’ (Brocker & Künkler, 2013, p. 180).
By not viewing fragmentation as indicative of radicalization,
fragmentation may well enable a shift in internal practice for how
conﬂicts are handled thus providing space for alternative visions.
This aligns with the perspectives in the moderation literature that
push for further attention to be given to changes in the belief sys-
tem of political elites that may provide insights into how the
ideological prescripts of political groups that seek radical outcomes
may be altered over time (e.g., Schwedler, 2011; Tezcür, 2010;
Wickham, 2004).
Based on the above discussion, this study uses the following
conceptualization of when and how ideational and programmatic
change can occur: exposure to new ideas may strengthen moderate
tendencies (Brocker & Künkler, 2013), and this strengthening,
combined with the notion that the leaders of secessionist move-
ments ‘bid’ for legitimacy, as described above (McConnell&Wilson,
2015), is a fruitful way of thinking about ideological moderation
and how reframing becomes possible. To explain decisions by
secessionist leaders to undergo a programmatic shift from propa-
gating secession to accepting e or promoting e regionalism and
prevent an internal split, it is critical to assess and trace the links
between the group's organizational evolution and the shifts in in-
ternal power dynamics that occur as the group adopts new pro-
grammatic positions. Whether there is an internal shift in the
balance of power becomes ‘a function of both the degree of au-
thority assigned by the organizational structure and the inﬂuence
obtained through informal bargaining and coalition building’ (Berti,
2013, p. 20).
The following analysis of GAM identiﬁes three interaction
points: the emergence of competing groupswithin civil society that
creates a new momentum and a potential weakening of the
movement's leadership; theweakening of a radical wing within the
diaspora community and the creation of new transnational net-
works, which shift the discourse away from the ethno-nationalist
stream; and international brokerage as an arena for direct politi-
cal engagement through international and domestic diplomacy.
Methodology
GAM e a critical case
GAM is chosen as a critical case to assess and describe the links
between organizational change and ideological moderation in
secessionist movements. GAM is characterized as a critical case in
that it is presumed that if the theoretical propositions made are ‘…
valid for this case, [they are] valid for all (or many) other cases’
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230). In many aspects, GAM represents an
archetypical secessionist movement: it combined guerrilla warfare
with experiments in governance and attempts to attract interna-
tional recognition via its ‘Government in Exile’ and by engaging in
international diplomacy. Despite experiencing periodic defeats on
the battleﬁeld that forced it to retreat and remobilize, GAM can be
considered relatively stable and institutionalized in that it persisted
in its struggle for a prolonged periods and had a stable leadership
and organizational structure, in addition to a core of loyal followers,
including a sizable diaspora community that provided the move-
ment with signiﬁcant resources.
At the same time, GAM followed an atypical trajectory of conﬂict
resolution in that the move from ‘bullets to ballots’ was accompa-
nied by ideological moderation on the secessionism-regionalism
spectrum. GAM's successor party, Partai Aceh, can be categorized
as an ethno-regionalist party.1 The 2005 peace agreement, the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed by the rebel lead-
ership and the Indonesian government stipulated special autonomy
and provisions for local political parties.2 Since 2006, the former
rebels have dominated politics in the province after winning sub-
stantial shares of the vote in three consecutive elections.
While the extant literature on the Aceh peace process offers
fruitful explanations regarding the context of the Helsinki peace
agreement (Aspinall, 2009b; Kingsbury, 2006), the role of civil so-
ciety and the pro-democracy movement in forging an inclusive
agreement (T€ornquist, 2011) and the political dynamic of GAM's
transformation (Aspinall, 2009a; Stange, 2010; Sindre 2016a), these
studies focus on the external factors or the transformation process
itself. The decision by the rebel leadership to accept the terms of the
MoU is often explained in terms of offering the rebels a ﬁnal way
out without them ‘losing face’ after a period of heavy military
losses. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, which caused substantial
damage to Aceh, is also perceived to have incentivized the rebel
leadership's desire to seek peace and restitution for the Acehnese
(Le Billon &Waizenegger, 2007; Sukma, 2006). These perspectives
align with conventional conﬂict resolution theory, which empha-
sizes the centrality of a ripe moment combined with the strategic
interests of the protagonists during an internationally led media-
tion process (Stedman, 1997; Zartman, 1985). In the wider context,
1 This article follows De Winter's deﬁnition that the core mission of ethno-
regionalist parties is to protect, enhance or achieve some form of territorial self-
government for their homeland (De Winter, 1998, p. 204).
2 Aceh is the only province in Indonesia where local parties can run for elections.
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GAM's pursuit of democracy and its emphasis on ‘replacing bullets
with ballots’ is also often argued to be part of a broader strategy to
gain access to peace dividends and the economic spoils associated
with the inﬂux of international aid following the 2004 tsunami
disaster (Aspinall, 2009a; Beardsley & McQuinn, 2009). It has also
been suggested that the transition to democracy in Indonesia and
the subsequent decentralization reform further legitimized the
Indonesian state in Aceh, rendering the claim that self-
determination was a necessary step in the process of securing de-
mocracy and protecting human rights in the province superﬂuous
(Miller, 2006; Robinson, 1998).
While acknowledging the validity of several of these arguments
in describing and explaining the enabling environment for the
ending of the conﬂict in Aceh, this paper draws attention to an
additional process, namely, that of its ideological de-radicalization,
which is understood here as the ideological and behavioral move
from propagating secession (radical) toward autonomy (moderate).
This move corresponds to the process inwhich the rebel leadership
replaced a narrowly deﬁned claim to self-determination through
secession with the risky prospect of seeking representation in
provincial-level politics. As Miller (2012) suggests, the framework
for self-government enabled former rebels ‘to engage construc-
tively with the Indonesian national process of development rather
than opposing it.’ What is lacking in the current understanding of
the resolution of secessionist conﬂicts, such as that in Aceh, is a
deeper assessment of the internal changes that motivate and
enable more compromise-oriented attitudes within the rebel
organization.
Empirical material
The empirical arguments presented below draw on primary
interviews with key ﬁgures within the GAM leadership, several
mid-level commanders, civil society activists, members of inter-
national NGOs and peace monitors in Aceh during the period
2006e2014. The interviews focused on the organizational struc-
tures and strategies and broader ideas around ideology and polit-
ical transformation. Triangulated with secondary material, the
interviews reveal how organizational expansion and debate
encouraged learning at critical turning points in the movement's
existence.3
Retrospectively analyzing the ideology and convictions of
members of armed political groups clearly poses several method-
ological challenges. Themost signiﬁcant challenge concerns the use
of retrospective memory of processual change that also requires
cognitive adaptation. The analysis presented here can be chal-
lenged by arguing that the key actors simply adapted their narrative
to ﬁt real-world events as they occurred. One premise for the
analysis is that during the Helsinki peace negotiations and in the
decade since, leaders and members of the former GAM who are
now largely associated with the Aceh Party have adapted a
regionalist political platform and program. Although secessionist
discourse reoccurs among some former rebel group members, it is
no longer the primary driving force within the party or among ex-
combatants. Hence, the critical mass of individuals who are
convinced of a new political direction is sufﬁciently large. The
argument that some individuals may primarily be driven by eco-
nomic incentives remains relevant. The analysis presented here
does not negate the signiﬁcance of individual leaders' and mem-
bers’ desire for social and economic advancement as important to
their political participation. While this might be a necessary con-
dition, it is not a sufﬁcient condition for seeking accommodation.
For one, leaders who were living in exile chose to remain loyal to
the GAM despite opportunities for alternative life choices. For local
commanders, access to illicit economies has not been sufﬁcient to
ensure demobilization or a shift away from the movement. Indeed,
the interviews conducted in the immediate post-conﬂict period in
2006 revealed anxiety among the commanders that they would
lose relevance or that the elections would be hijacked.
Case analysis
Ideology of secession and state visions
The separatist conﬂict in Aceh was one of the most divisive
conﬂicts in Indonesia's recent history. Debates over regional iden-
tity, territorial integrity and autonomy have ﬁgured prominently in
the formation of the modern Indonesian state. Prior to the colonial
period, Aceh had been one of the few territories in what was to
become Indonesia that was internationally recognized as a sover-
eign territory that could defend its borders militarily (Reid, 1969).
When Indonesia was constructed as a federal republic in 1949,
Aceh's political elites expected a political framework that would
allow for a considerable amount of regional autonomy on the part
of the constituent states of the newly founded republic. However,
faced with increased tensions between an emerging nationalist
elite, who viewed centralization of power in the capital Jakarta to
be necessary for the country's nation-building project, Indonesia
was unilaterally reconstituted as a unitary state in 1950. Subse-
quently, Aceh lost its status as a semi-autonomous territory and
became integrated into the province of Northern Sumatra (Reid,
1969).
Political mobilization in the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the formal
establishment of GAM as a secessionist ‘liberation movement’ in
1976, was focused on reafﬁrming Aceh's autonomy in relation to
Jakarta and the central state. Then-governor Tuengku Daud Ber-
ueruh ﬁrst made a declaration by the Federated State of Aceh in
1953 e after joining the nationwide Darul Islam Indonesia rebellion
(Kell, 1995). The Darul Islam rebellion was not initially a separatist
movement but instead aimed to transform the entire state struc-
ture in the direction of an Islamic state. In disagreeing with these
nationwide aims of the movement, Beureuh's group joined with
another emerging rebellion, the Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of Indonesia Overall Struggle. While none of these
movements gained any momentum, the central state sought ac-
commodation through the granting of nominal special autonomy
status to Aceh in 1959, which was formally accepted by the
Acehnese parties in 1963. Nevertheless, with the onset of the New
Order regime, which was characterized by rapid centralization of
government structures and centralization of power within the
military, any attempt to appease local economic interests was
abandoned altogether (Kell, 1995).
Against this backdrop of the manifestation of separatist de-
mands and the political program upon which it was founded, GAM
mobilized sufﬁcient organizational resources to challenge the
Indonesian state for close to three decades. The GAM founders were
primarily driven by a notion of ethnic nationalism as the basis for
their claim to statehood.
Immediately after its inception, military counterinsurgency
campaigns forced the rebel leadership to ﬂee. Having been granted
political asylum, they established a base in Sweden and formed the
‘Aceh government’, dividing ministerial posts among them. During
the 1980s, a heavy crackdown on the separatist movement inside
Aceh further strengthened the anti-state opposition and led to
rapid growth in the number of members and supporters of the
3 Most of the interviews were carried out in NGO ofﬁces, at the headquarters of
the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA), at the Partai Aceh head ofﬁce (in 2008), at
rallies and in hotel lobbies and coffee shops in Banda Aceh.
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GAM. Aceh's self-determination struggle thus took place on two
fronts: domestically and transnationally. One can crudely describe
the domestic sector of the movement as an operative guerrilla
structure based around a military wing, while the transnational
sector, whichwas headed by the Government in Exile, supported by
a growing Acehnese diaspora.
Anchored in ethno-nationalist demands, the programmatic goal
was to reinstate Aceh as a separate state based on the Acehnese
state code under the rule of the Sultan. The original notion of self-
determination was framed in backward-looking terms: there is
‘no historical, political, cultural, economic or geographic relation-
ship’ with the Javanese state construct of Indonesia. Independence
was thus depicted as an act of restoring Aceh's sovereignty. The
GAM insurgency also beneﬁted from a narrative of historical op-
position to foreign occupiers with lineage from the colonial period.
Although the leaders did not offer Islam a prominent place in its
political program or discourse, the continued use of Islamic sym-
bols in its ﬂag and emblems and references to Aceh's special his-
torical relationship with the Islamic world formed part of the
ethno-national discourse. The emphasis on Islam further
strengthened the transnational links of the movement they
received training and ﬁnancial support from Gadhaﬁ's Libya
network in the 1980s.4
Wartime organizational structure: exile and homeland
While running a rebel organization from a position of exile
posed challenges in terms of organizational logistics and cohesion
of the on-the ground guerrilla operations, the distance to the
homeland also served to strengthen the imagery of GAM, particu-
larly its strength, capacity and relentless work to secure Aceh's
future. From their base in an apartment in a Stockholm suburb, Tiro
and his ‘ministers,’ Malik Mahmud, Zaini Abdullah and Bachtiar
Abdullah, communicatedwith their commanders and supporters in
Aceh while they kept track of organized Acehnese communities
around the world. They established and supported the running of
‘government diplomatic ofﬁces’ in the United States, Malaysia and
Australia and organized an elaborate fundraising system in the
diaspora communities in these countries.5 In the late 1980s, when
hundreds of ﬁghters were returning from training in Libya to ﬁght
in Aceh, they established a National Assembly (Majelis Nasional) in
Malaysia. The National Assembly became GAM's command centre
in Malaysia, from which they raised funds and organized supplies
to be sent to Aceh. The Assembly provided a much-needed orga-
nizational link between the exiled leadership and the ‘homeland’
and was an arena for the recruitment and politicization of com-
batants. Importantly, the focus was on the war effort at home.
Although the signiﬁcance of the Libya training for the military ca-
pacity of GAM should not be overestimated, the fact that GAM was
part of a global network of ﬁghters provided internal legitimacy
and strengthened the imagery of the leadership as persistent,
capable and strong.
The di Tiro name carried strong symbolism of a Free Aceh, a
vision that was enabled by the distance between the Aceh home-
land and the world outside. Self-assigned as the Wali Nanggroe,
until 1997, he is said to have been in charge of all of GAM's diplo-
matic activities and public relations and acted as the ‘strategic su-
preme command.’ Some authors have argued that ‘it was the
movement's leaders abroad that kept the conﬂict in Aceh going for
more than two decades' (Missbach, 2013, p. 1057). Despite its
attempts to lobby international organizations and integrate itself
into the global network of indigenous and oppressed peoples, the
Aceh Government was not very successful at attracting interna-
tional support, and they were kept at a distance by most major
international players and NGOs (Aspinall, 2007;Missbach, 2013). Di
Tiro was especially bitter about what he viewed as ‘indifference of
the UN and themajor powers toward the Acehnese cause’ (Aspinall,
2002, p. 15). The Aceh Government's greatest accomplishment was
propagating within GAM and to domestic audiences a narrative
about their continuous efforts as representatives of the Acehnese,
working heedlessly to gain international recognition and to inform
the world about the plight of the Acehnese people.
In thewords of a former commander, ‘independencewas always
imminent, tomorrow or the day after; it was just around the corner.’
Missbach (2013) notes that even though GAM did not meet their
expectations, people did not abandon hope. The perpetuation of
these unrealistic hopes for support from the outside contributed to
upholding the level of popular support and trust in GAM. In an
interview in 1999, Zaini Abdullah said that ‘the outcome [of
lobbying] is quite good. Their support is already coming, including
from Britain, Norway and other European countries. We are very
conﬁdent in time our struggle will be granted success.’6 Of course,
at this particular time, there had been more interest in Aceh from
donor countries, especially Norway, Switzerland and Japan, but the
focus was on averting a humanitarian crisis and mediating a peace
settlement, with little interest in GAM's pledge of independence.7
The organizational structure had become more complex, with re-
sources allocated to developing transnational networks for fund-
raising via the National Council, a tight-knit diaspora community,
and more coherent attempts at diplomacy while upholding the
pressure at home. The ethno-nationalist ideology that the Aceh
Government propagated throughout the diaspora and at home
served ‘to bridge the gap between the real world of disappointment
and defeats and the political longing that they had helped to create’
(Missbach, 2013, p. 1080).
New parameters for political mobilization: organizational growth
and conﬂict
The collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 triggered un-
precedented opportunity for political mobilization and rebel group
organizational expansion within Aceh. While others have analyzed
the political climate of conﬂict escalation and rebel governance
(Barter, 2015; Schultze, 2003), the purpose here is to specify the
nodes of contact that enable intra-organizational debate to explain
ideological moderation on the issue of secession. Thus, important
for the argument here is the emphasis on how organizational
expansion triggered not only intra-organizational debate and crit-
icism but also the potential alienation of the leadership.
In the immediate period following the end of the NewOrder, the
GAM leadership pursued the military strategy that it was most
familiar with, namely, recruitment and training of new ﬁghters and
commanders, territorial expansion and low-intensity warfare, and
it paid little attention to developing its political apparatus. In
addition, this is also the period when the GAM leadership was most
effective at implementing a tax collection apparatus. In terms of
organizational evolution, this expansion was important for estab-
lishing new networks and solidifying GAM's presence beyond its
core strongholds (Author ref withheld for peer review). However,
4 Approximately 600 GAM members received guerrilla training in Libya from
1976 to 1986.
5 Author interview with Bachtiar Abdullah, Banda Aceh, June 6, 2008.
6 Zaini Abdullah, interview with DeTAK, July 24, 1999, cited in Missbach (2013,
1071).
7 Author interviews with ofﬁcials from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the International Red Cross, Oslo and Geneva, 2010 and 2014, respectively.
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military expansion also meant that GAM's presence was more
acutely felt across the province, and its activities became subject to
unprecedented scrutiny and attention. While the international
community had paid little attention to GAM in earlier periods, the
political instability across Indonesia alongside reports of a
mounting humanitarian crisis inside Aceh triggered donors to
become more attentive to the Aceh problem. The peace talks that
followed, headed by an international NGO and supported by do-
nors, were not centered on outlining a solution to the conﬂict but
rather on forging collaborations between GAM and the Indonesian
government on how to distribute humanitarian aid (Barakat,
Connolly, & Large, 2002; Sindre, 2014).
In terms of political discourse and speciﬁcally their position on
secession, the talks highlighted GAM's staunch position on inde-
pendence. To GAM, the peace talks represented a long sought-after
opportunity to woo the international community into supporting
their independence claim, anchored in their perception of inter-
national law. The talks also represented a space to assert its role as
the main legitimate representative of the Acehnese. From 1999 to
2004, however, there was a remarkable shift in this discourse.
Organizational change, diversiﬁcation and internal debate
Opposition groups emerged and grew stronger. For a brief but
determinant period from 1998 to 2000, an urban-based activist
community of students became the primus motor for the anti-state
mobilization, and not the GAM commanders or their leaders. There
was great variety in the types of opposition at this time. Many of the
opposition groups did not support GAM; in fact, some were as
critical of GAM as they had been of the Indonesian state. Others
became vocal in their support for self-determination but called for a
shift in the modus operandi and the abandonment of the armed
movement in favor of non-violent opposition. The formation of
SIRA (the Information Centre for a Referendum on Aceh) in 1999,
which was a coalition of civil society groups, strengthened the
organizational impetus of the activists to increase the pressure on
the Indonesian government.
An initial feature of the activist oppositionmovement was that it
grew out of Indonesian networks that identiﬁed as Indonesian.
Their political message was simple and compelling. They empha-
sized inclusion, justice, human rights, development and democracy
while also asserting their autonomy from GAM, whose program
and ideas they viewed as backward-looking and distinctly un-
modern (Aspinall, 2009b, p. 129). An independence referendum,
they posited, was consistent with modern democratic principles
andwould not automatically propel GAM into power. Moreover, the
SIRA leaders proved to be good organizers, administrators and
communicators, as they attracted unprecedented popular support
from across the province, set up ofﬁces, organized debate forums,
printed leaﬂets and disseminated information over the radio. For
several months, it was the blue and white SIRA ﬂag rather than
GAM's red and white that was the most visible sign of anti-state
mobilization. The largest event organized by SIRA was a ‘referen-
dum march’ in Banda Aceh on November 8, 1999, which attracted
about one million people.
In the meantime, GAM recruited separately and largely under-
cover. The intensiﬁcation of the political discourse and the speed
with which it moved into the popular domain took the leaders by
surprise, and they found themselves on the sideline. From within
GAM, some argued that support for a referendum would award the
Indonesian government legitimacy as the deciding authority. GAM's
leadership feared that a referendum, in the event of it leading to
secession, would diminish their political relevance. One argued that
‘[t]he idea of a referendum was in itself illegitimate. The power to
“award” the people that choice was not theirs [the Indonesian
government] to make.’8 In addition, there was a growing distance
between the domestic front of commanders and the exiled leader-
ship that was aligned with the National Council, which now played a
central role in recruiting new ﬁghters and strategizing for the mili-
tary takeover of the district councils and villages.
The initial collaborative activities between GAM and SIRA ac-
tivists grew out of individual ties between a select few GAM com-
manders and individual student activists.9 The establishment of
SIRA ofﬁces across the province was welcomed by several of the
GAM commanders, who viewed SIRA as a model for strengthening
the inﬂuence of GAM as a political player. In several places, the
activists and NGOs developed close ties with other community
leaders, such as ulama (religious leaders) and village heads, who
opened the mosques for political meetings and gatherings.10
Through these local links, activists provided organizational and
discursive skills, and they boldly raised new concerns and debated
Aceh's future prospects. An alliance gradually emerged from these
collaborative activities, and eventually, segments of the activist
community were incorporated into the rebel organization. For
some activists, the meetings shifted their perspective. As one of the
activists who joined GAM said, ‘I had been very critical of the
guerrillas before, but that was before I knew them. When we met
face-to-face, I started to value their sacriﬁce and I also saw the good
that they did in their communities. They were indeed true
heroes.’11 Aspinall (2009b) details how some groups underwent a
cultural revival during this period by starting to speak Acehnese
and propagating Acehnese history and ideas.
Activists fulﬁlled important tasks within the rebel movement as
they helped to establish GAM's administrative apparatus. In effect,
they took on the function of a rebel civilian wing. They acted as
administrators and publicists (Barter, 2015, pp. 235e6), thus
providing the GAM apparatus with a set of skills. Crucially, the
activists were focused on improving the rebel group's governance
apparatus, which included seeking to establish a more systematic,
predictable and regular system for tax collection and issuing cer-
tiﬁcates and diplomas (Aspinall, 2009b, p. 159).12 They also drew on
their NGO experience in overseeing the distribution of aid from
international NGOs. However, beyond this speciﬁc aspect of
governance, the most important function of the civilianwing e and
one that has had a lasting impact on the movement in its transition
to peace e was to develop a more professional organization that
started to resemble a political movement and party.
This professionalization and organizational restructuring
included establishing ofﬁces across Aceh that nurtured close con-
tact with communities to develop GAM's popular proﬁle, attract
new members and supporters and engage in political debate. The
civilian wing acted as mediators between rebel commanders and
communities and between international NGOs and the rebel
commanders. The civilian GAM also gained more traction during
the initial peace talks headed by the Swiss-based NGO the Henry
Dunant Centre (HDC). These talks were primarily focused on the
two sides of the conﬂict reaching agreement to collaborate in the
distribution of aid (Barakat, Lume, & Salvetti, 2000; Sindre, 2014).
International NGOs that were responsible for the distribution of
humanitarian aid were as critical of GAM as they were of the
Indonesian military.13 Reports of aid being diverted and the levying
8 Author interview, Drs. Adnan Beuransah, Banda Aceh June 4, 2008.
9 Author interview, Shadhia Marhaban, March 1, 2007, Banda Aceh.
10 Author interviews with pro-democracy activists, August 2006, Banda Aceh.
11 Author interview, Shadhia Marhaban, March 5, 2007, Banda Aceh.
12 Author interview, Muchsal Mina, February 9, 2007, Banda Aceh.
13 Author interview, representative from the International Red Cross/Red Cres-
cent, September 2, 2008.
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of road fees by rebel commanders in collusion with the military
contributed to the image of GAM commanders in the ﬁeld as
running ‘amok’ (Sindre, 2014). The position of the civilian wing of
GAM became further strengthened as they became the primary
modes of contact between international NGOs and GAM inside
Aceh. In that regard, as skilled negotiators, the activists provided
GAMwith a new ‘diplomatic vocabulary’ (Barter, 2015, p. 240). They
also pushed for more openness by establishing feedback mecha-
nisms and forums for channeling complaints by Acehnese living
under rebel control.14
In contrast to the Majelis in Malaysia, the aim of GAM's civilian
wing was not to facilitate GAM's military struggle, and its diplo-
macy was not focused on persuading the international community
of Aceh's de jure right to self-determination. Rather, it was to
develop a political organization that could take on the re-
sponsibility of representing the Acehnese and pushing for political
reform. From their perspective, such reform could be envisioned to
take place within a new state or, alternatively, within a new po-
litical framework. Many of the activists who joined the GAM ranks
clearly had become convinced that self-determinationwas the only
viable option throughwhich they could shift the political discourse,
but their premise and vision for a new state differed signiﬁcantly
from that projected by the National Council and in di Tiro's texts.
Hence, although the activists were also ‘awakened’ and ‘inspired’ by
the history of Aceh's resistance (Aspinall, 2009a), their inclusion
triggered renewed emphasis on a political program and debates
about the competing visions of Aceh's future. Because the alliance
developed domestically and was rooted in the GAM's local network
structure, it excluded the central leadership. Hence, collusion led to
an internal shift in the balance of power away from the central
leadership and toward the network of local commanders. Com-
bined with the changing external political environment, this
structure led to the strengthening of a new faction and the weak-
ening of the role of the central leadership. In this context, intra-
organizational conﬂict was not a simple dichotomy of radical
versus moderate. Instead, it was the formation of a new faction on
the basis of opportunities for alliance building and collusion of
interests that cut across the old hierarchical cleavages that had
worked as part of the survival strategy for the armed movement.
Factionalism thus went deeper and to the core of the movement's
purpose, challenging the fundamental visions that its members had
for Aceh.
In addition to transforming the rebel organization inside Aceh,
the strengthening of GAM's civilian wing also impacted the trans-
national dimension of the movement. A ﬁrst formal outcome that
reﬂected the ongoing internal debate over the visions of the ‘Aceh
state’ came in the form of a new ‘constitution,’ which is often
referred to as the ‘Stavanger Declaration’, made in Norway in 2002.
At the meeting were the leadership, members of the diaspora, and
key ﬁgureswithin the civilianwingwho had been forced to ﬂee and
seek refuge abroad after renewed counter-insurgency campaigns.
The manifesto played down the ethno-nationalist language and
explicitly stated that the prospective Government of the State of
Aceh would be based on democratic principles. This aspect was the
most critical element in the 2005 peace negotiations (Kingsbury,
2007, p. 173). Bahctiar Abdullah said that ‘the Stavanger meeting
was important because it united the different groups and fronts
within the movement … Many had been skeptical of the civil so-
ciety approach, and now they got a better understanding of what
they were trying to achieve. The meeting served to unify the
movement and streamline the political message.’15 Justiﬁcation
was also offered retrospectively. Nur Djuli, who later became a key
ﬁgure in the Helsinki process, advocated for a ‘modernization’ of
the ‘state code’ rather than replacing it with something completely
new.16 ‘We did not abandon our vision; we have adapted it so that
others can understand it.’17 The original state code was largely
inﬂuenced by traditional Acehnese models of authority, which
entailed a ‘state code’ based on divisions of power between a king
(Wali Nanggroe), a religious (Islamic) authority (Imam Syah Kuala), a
cultural authority (Princess Putroe Phan), and the government
administration (Bentara). Within this structure, ‘no individual (or
single group) dominated the political process.’18 The ‘state code’
was thus described as a ‘power-sharing’ framework that, while not
based on a model of electoral democracy, was ‘much more “dem-
ocratic” than the traditional Javanese hierarchical authority struc-
tures.’19 Based on this framework, the movement also espoused an
ideal about the traditional power-sharing mechanisms between a
village chief, the imam and the bentara and the ‘re-introduction’ of
procedures of consultation at the village level.20 Others from
among the leadership proposed ‘making the “state code” more
modern’ by suggesting that GAM should transform into a ‘social
democratic party.’21
The emphasis on regionalismwas thus not formally endorsed or
even propagated prior to the Helsinki agreement, but the internal
shifts in the balance of power and the de-emphasis on ethno-
national discourse to the advantage of democracy and human
rights made such a shift tenable. This shift provided a new basis
uponwhich peace talks could be facilitated. To that end, the mature
moment did not come from battle fatigue but rather from the
manifestation of GAM into a new type of political movement. From
this perspective, it was feasible for the international negotiators to
frame the peace talks around the core conﬂict issues and focus the
negotiations on questions of regional autonomy, with the aim to
reach a compromise.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper set out to identify mechanisms for ideological
moderation on the issue of secession within armed secessionist
movements. A shift from demanding secession towards demanding
autonomy should be understood as a process of ideological de-
radicalization in the core ideology of ethno-nationalist groups
and is, as is argued, a prerequisite for negotiated settlements that
maintains the existing state. It is also reasonable to assume that
ideological de-radicalization on the issue of secession increases the
chances for long-term political stability as secessionist wars end.
The theoretical argument developed in the conceptual framework
has been illustrated through an analysis of how organizational
expansion led to a shift in ideological discourse within the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM).
First, the argument presented here highlights that the move
from demanding a new state to adopting a regionalist stance, is
largely a function of the internal shifts in themovement's dominant
14 Author interview, Munawarliza Zein, Banda Aceh, August 5, 2006.
15 Author interview, Bachtiar Abdullah, June 8, 2008, Banda Aceh.
16 Author interview, Nur Djuli, Banda Aceh, February 8, 2007. Nur Djuli's
perspective is also elaborated on in Kingsbury (2007).
17 Author interview, Bachtiar Abdullah, June 8; Zaini Abullah, June 6, 2008.
18 Kingsbury (2007, 17) citing Malik Machmod, the ‘Prime Minister’: Adat bak Po
Teumeureuhom, Hukum bak Syah Kuala, Kanun bak Putroe Phan, Reusam bak
Bentara (Power rests with the king, Law with the Great Imam of Syah Kuala,
Tradition with the Princess of Pahang and Regulation with the Bentara). Also dis-
cussed in author interviews with GAM leaders Zaini Abdullah, Bachtiar Abdullah,
Nur Djuli and Muzakkir Manaf Mualem in February 2007 and June 2008.
19 Author interview, Zaini Abdullah, Banda Aceh, June 6, 2008, Banda Aceh.
20 Author interview, Nur Djuli, March 2006. See also Kingsbury (2007) for details.
21 Author interview, Bachtiar Abdullah, June 1, 2008, Banda Aceh.
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faction triggered by twomechanisms, organizational diversiﬁcation
and internal debate. For the GAM case, the incorporation of civil
society activists into the rebel organization led to the strengthening
of the civilianwing, increased internal debate over state visions and
aweakened rebel leadership. The outcomewas internal debate and
emphasis on developing a new political program, which tran-
scended the movements' domestic and transnational organiza-
tional structure. The strengthening of ties between activists and
certain individuals among the leadership ahead of the Helsinki
negotiations encouraged a strategic shift among the leadership. On
the one hand, this shift conforms to the theoretical expectation that
the emergence of a pluralistic sphere that subjects the movement
to public scrutiny could potentially bring about signiﬁcant changes.
On the other hand, when taking into account the transnational
character of secessionist liberation movements, the GAM case il-
lustrates that although moderates will beneﬁt from international
activism to attract international attention, as the internal focus
shifts from seeking international recognition for an independent
state towards regionalism, domestic political dynamics and intra-
organizational changes take precedence.
Second, the study has shown that the party literature, and
especially the literature on organizational change and moderation,
sheds new light on the internal politics of armed radical move-
ments. GAM conforms to several theoretical expectations from the
party literature, such as Harmel and Janda’s (1994, 281) argument
that factionalism may provide an internal impetus for movements
to change. As has also been highlighted by Berti (2013) and
Schwedler (2011), ideological moderation does not necessarily
depict a linear process in that requires a uniﬁed organizational
transition. Rather, it is a function of the emergence of a moderate
wing that supplants the dominant faction. In this setting, potential
spoilers may either be weakened and sidelined, or incorporated
into the movement. Arguably, the latter will increase chances of a
stable transition from armed to non-armed movement, while the
former may only pose a spoiler problem if they regain strength at a
later point.
This line of reasoning also emphasizes the role of the leadership
and moderates in successfully convincing the broader rebel orga-
nization of the beneﬁts of a compromise solution. In Aceh, the
discursive reframing of autonomy as ‘self-government’ in place of
the more common term ‘special autonomy’ and the recasting of
GAM as ‘liberators’ and ‘defenders of peace’ proved an important
strategy to ensure continued commitment by ideological hard-
liners, especially during the volatile period of negotiations. The
mechanisms identiﬁed in this study, organizational diversiﬁcation,
as a speciﬁc form of fragmentation, and internal debate help
explain the conditions under which moderates take the lead within
radical movements in questions over war-to-peace transitions and
post-war political trajectories.
Third, while the literature on party change and rebel group
transformation alike have suggested that moderation should pri-
marily be understood as the endorsement of democratic principles,
this study has suggested that ideological moderation on the issue of
secession is equally important. When both states and former armed
groups accept the premise of a multi-ethnic and multi-regional
state, focus can shift towards de facto governance and peace-
building. The change in ideological positions is closely tied to the
organizational impetus of the movements reﬂecting a transition
identifying as ‘state-challengers’ or ‘governments in waiting’ to
conform the institutional framework of competitive pluralism and
party politics within the state.
With attention to identifying mechanisms that explain changes
in ideology, these insights can potentially help explain moderation
e or lack thereof e in other armed secessionist movements as well.
For instance, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the
Philippines has moderated on the issue of secession and signed the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which stipulates au-
tonomy. Moderation in the anti-government position of MILF
leaders can be illustrated by the increase in collaborative activities
between rebel commanders and the government prior to the
signing of the agreement, including contributing to shaping gov-
ernment development policies (Walch, 2014, pp. 47e8). An issue to
be further explored is the viability of the argument that such
collaboration took place in a context of the strengthening of the
political wing and whether this corresponds to an internal shift in
discourse.
The failure of the peace negotiations between the LTTE and the
Sri Lankan government to reach a compromise can be partially
understood in light of the argument developed in this paper. The
LTTE underwent a process of organizational diversiﬁcation similar
to that of GAM: They formed a political wing, established admin-
istrative ofﬁces and developed alliances with Tamil parties (Sindre,
2014). Yet, the militant wing remained in control over political is-
sues and any alliance between activists in the diaspora and LTTE
moderates, never gained enough leverage to shift the discourse
away from the narrowly deﬁned ethno-nationalist agenda. While
there are several other reasons why the conﬂict between the LTTE
and Sri Lanka military re-escalated after 2006, lack of internal
debate and continued exclusion of alternative voices may shed
some light on the question of why the LTTE proved less amenable to
compromise on the issue of secession. Future research on the links
between rebel governance, rebel fragmentation/cohesion and
conﬂict resolution should therefore focus on the relative signiﬁ-
cance of the military wing remaining in control over political issues
despite the presence of an apparently prominent political wing.
Future research can build upon the present conclusions and
examine how they hold across cases. At the policy level, this article
has provided evidence in support of including civil society in peace
talks, although it also cautions against assuming that civil society
has sufﬁcient leverage to directly impact change. A better under-
standing of how power is distributed within these movements,
how it evolves and the relationship between central leadership and
on-the-ground networks would help in determining where to put
pressure. Similarly, the article has drawn attention to ideology as a
central feature for understanding the political adaptation and
change by armed political groups in the context of war-to-peace
transitions.
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